The Effect of Our Civil War on Contracts by Schultz, William J.
Cornell Law Library
Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository
Historical Theses and Dissertations Collection Historical Cornell Law School
1896
The Effect of Our Civil War on Contracts
William J. Schultz
Cornell Law School
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/historical_theses
Part of the Law Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Historical Cornell Law School at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Historical Theses and Dissertations Collection by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital
Repository. For more information, please contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Schultz, William J., "The Effect of Our Civil War on Contracts" (1896). Historical Theses and Dissertations Collection. Paper 341.
THESIS
THE EFFECT OF OUR CIVIL WAR ON CONTRACTS
PRESENTED
BY
WILLIAM J. S-C}ULTZ
FOR
THE DEGREE OF BACHELOR OF LAW
CORNELL UNIVERSITY
1896.

THE EFFECT OF OUR CIVIL WAR ON CONTRACTS.
CONTENTS.
I.
The Object of War and What it is.
II.
The Importance of Public Policy and its Relations.
III.
The Effects of War on Contracts.
(a) Licences.
(b) Executed Contracts.
(c) Unexecuted and Continuing Contracts.
(d) Effects on Interest and the Stat-
ute of Limitations.
(e) Treaties.
IV.
Conclusion.
The Object of War and What It is.
Before we can look at the effects of war, we must
know what war is and what its objects are. War has been de-
fined as an armed contest waged as public force between inde-
pendent states or an organized company of belligerents and in-
dependent states. What its objects are, is a question of broad
expanse and investigation shows most interesting results.
The war among the early tribes was an exhibition of physical
and brute force. No rules of law were looked at and its only
object was to gain the property of your opponent even at the
cost of life. Then what a man had, he must fight to keep and
'may the stronger win" was their motto. This idea of war must
have existed in our more civilized times, as Vattell puts it,
"That the declaration of war authorizes, and even obliges every
subject of whatever rank, to secure the persons and things of
their enemies where they fall into their hands. " However the
ideas of men have indeed changed)and no longer do we seek de-
struction of anothers goods, but rather the preservation thereof.
Mr. Story, in his book on contracts (Sec. 743-746), assigns
the following reason why contracts are void during war. "That
it is the policy of two couhtries at war to injure each other
to their utmost ability, even though such injury may be recoil-
ing continuously. Besides, no two countries can be at war and
have their subjects at peace. The very object of war is thus
frustrated." I am fully convinced, though, that even Mr.
Story's rule is a little too hard under the prevailing customs
of war. The great safe guard is public policy. This guides
us to our sense of right and wrong and is too well settled to
admit dispute. See (Potts vs. Bell, 8 Term. Rep., 348.)
II.
The Importance of Public Policy and its relations.
Public Policy forbids Courts of Justice to allow
any validity to contracts with belligerents, because of their
tendency to effect injuriously the highest public interests and
to undermine or destroy the safeguards of social fabric. (Sprotts
vs. U. S., 20 Wall. 459). Thus where a promisory note was given
as consideration for services to go as substitute in the Confed-
erate army and fight against the United States, (Chancely vs.
Bailey et al., 37 Ga. 532) it was held that such a contract was
illegal and void, because against Public Policy and in Pichens
vs. Eckridge (42 Miss. 142),which is a similiar case, it was
held to be a void consideration, because a contract contrary
to the public policy of the United States and directly in aid
of the Rebellion.
In an action on promisory note given as security
for purchase price of war bonds issued by Arkansas convention
and purchased by defendant as a mere business transaction, the
Court held that such a contract was against public policy, so
no action could be sustained in the Federal Courts and that the
consideration was illegal under principals of law, the Consti-
tution of the United States and laws of Congress and procla-
mation of the President. The issue of such bonds, though used
as a circulating medium in the state, did not constitute a for-
ced currency which the people in the state were obliged to use.
(Hanawer vs. Woodruff, 15 Wall. 439).
III.
The Effect of War on Contracts.
According to most international law writers, the
necessary and immediate consequence of war is to prohibit all
intercourse or dealing between the subjects of the belligerent
states." This doctrine is founded on the principal that a
declnration of war not only puts the adverse governments in
their political capacities at war, but also renders the subjects
of one the enemies of the other.
The English rule is that "A subject domiciled
cannot make a c(cintract against the interests of his country."
The case of Potts vs. Bell (8 Term Rep. 548) is a leading Eng-
lish authority as to the effect of war and says, "A declaration
of war generally contains a prohibition to trade with the enemy,
but a proclamation for letters of Marque and Reprisal does not,
and it is only frou the prohibition of the King, by virtue of
his prerogative~that the illegality arises."
Anson says that any agreement which contemplates
action hostile to a friendly state is unlawful and void andmokz
only is it unlawful to enter into a contract with an alien enemy)
but it is unlawful to purchase goods in an enemy's country with-
out a licence of the crown. (Anson on Contracts, page 197)
Thus w~aay see that contracts between such enemies must of fact
be illegal and void, because how can they be perfect when one
of the most important ingredients of a contract - legality of
object - is wanting.
There are certain exceptions to the above strict
rule and it is now limited to contracts which are unexecuted
at the time of declaration of war. We might consider the sub-
ject in regard to three classes of contracts. First, contracts,
with which suspension during the continuance of hostilities is
the effect, or contracts executed before the war began. Secondly,
contracts which are absolutely void, or unexecuted contracts,
and thirdly, contracts, which, by their nature or object, would
be inconsistent with a suspension. The effect takes place
at once by the very existance of war and the notice is the
happening of the event. It is an act of Congress;and as Congress
has the power of making or declaring war, it has the undoubted
right to regulate and modifyin its discretion, the hostilities
which it sanctions. This is quite apparent in granting of
licences to parties to trade with belligerents. Contracts,
which oftheir nature will not admit of delay and suspension,
are often permitted to be fulfilled during state of hostility.
The opinion of Judge Jackson in Coolridge vs. Inglee (13 Mass.
26) offers an explanation of this situation and says: "Commer-
cial intercourse between two nations at war is understood to
be prohibited. This interdiction applies, in general, to any
species of commerce by which the enemy may be benefited at the
expense of our own country." But the books of highest authori-
ty on the law of nations and the usages of civilized people in
modern times abundantly prove that intercourse is not univer-
sally prohibited, and that in some cases contracts with an enemy
are allowable. After examining carefully and in detail the
statements of the text writers expressing the belief that' "the
prohibition is confined among all civilized nations in modern
times to such intercourse as is commercial and dismissing the
idea of something mysteriously noxious with an enemy." The
case in point was the sale by one Americah citizen to another
of a British licence. Judge Jackson held that the sale was
good, but he was overruled on the ground that it would be un-
lawful for an American citizen to use it. Another most inter-
esting case on the present point is that of Kershaw vs. Kelsey
(100 Mass. 561) in which the defendant was a citizen of Massa-
chusetts and the plaintiff was in Rebel territory. A contract
was made during the late Civil War to lease a plantation in
the South at a rent payable part in cash, and part from the
cotton raised thereon, and by which the lesser agreed to de-
liver and the lessee to receive and pay for the corn then on
the plantation and which was immediately delivered and used
thereon. This was held not to be prohibited by the law of
nations, or act of Congress in 1861, (Chapter 3, Sec. 5) and
proclamation of the President under that act. The elaborate
opinion of Gray, J. is worthy of our attention and in it we
may see t're correct view of our law of to-day. He says, "that
the result is that the law of nations, as judicially declared,
prohibits all intercourse between citizens of the two belliger-
ents which is inconsistent with the state of war between their
countries; and that this includes any act of voluntary submis-
sions to the enemy, or receiving his protection, as well as any
act or contract which tends to increase his resources; a~d every
kind of trading or commercial dealing or intercourse, whether
by submission of money or goods, or orders for the delivery of
either, between the two countries, directly or indirectly, or
through the intervention of third parties or partnerships, or
by contracts in any form looking to or involving such trans-
actions, or by insurances upon trade with only the enemy. The
cases have not been carried beyond judicial decision.
At this age of the world, when all the tendencies
of the law of nations are to exempt individuals and private
contracts from injury or restraint in consequence of war between
their governments, we are not disposed to declare such contracts
unlawful as have not been heretofore adjudged to be inconsis-
tent with the state of war.
The trading or transmission of property or money
which is prohibited by international law is from or to one of
the countries at war. An alien enemy residing in this country
Kent
may contract and sue like a citizen.(II.ACom. 63.) The crime
consists in exporting the money or property, or placing it in
the power of the enemy.
Public international law, being the rule which
governs the intercourse of one nation and its subjects with
another nation and its subjects, is ordinarily limited, so far
as the rights of property and contracts are concerned, to movable,
or, in the phrase of the common law, personal property which
is in its nature capable of being carried or transmitted from
one country to another; and does not usually touch private In-
terests in immovable property or real estate; although a gov-
ernraent may, by express law or edict, appropriate and confis-
cate for its own use, the profits or even the title of land
within its tevritory or occupation belonging to subjects of
the enemy. (III. Phillamore's Int. Law, 135, 731)
In regard to real estate there is no difference
between a friend and an alien, except that an alien cannot
maintain an action to recover it while it lasts, or that it may
be confiscatcd by an extraordinary act of the government.
Licences. (A)
In a civil war it is well settled that a sovereign
has belligerent as well as sovereign rights against his rebel
subjects and may exercise either at his discretion.
A state of war may exist ana yet commercial trans-
actions go on. They are not necessarily inconsistent with each
other. The licences to do business are partial suspenses of
the law of war and are common in modern times. While Bynker-
shoek in his Quaest. Juris Pub., (lib. I., ch. 3) says that war
causes the interdiction of commercial intercourse, he fuLirther
remarks: "The utility, however, of merchants and the mutual
wants of nations have almost got the better of the laws of war
as to commerce. Hence it is alternately permitted and forbidden
in time of war as 'rinces think it most for the interest of their
subjects. A commercial nation is anxious to trade and acoma-
date the laws of war to the greater or lesser wants that it may
be in the goods of others. Thus, sometimes a mutual commerce
is permitted generally; sometimes as t, certain merchandise only,
while others are permitted, and sometimes it is permitted alto-
gether.
10.
This licence is sort of a safe conduct granted by
a belligerent state to its own subjects, to those of its ene-
mies or to neutrals to carry on trade which is interdicted by
the laws of war and it operates as a dispensation from the pen-
alties of those laws, with respect to the state granting it
and so far as its terms can be fairly construed to extend. The
supreme power alone is competent to decide what conditions of
political or commercial expediency will justify a relaxation
or suspension of its belligerent rights and it requires the
good faith of the party receiving it. it is not subject to a
transfer or assignment or may be made in trust for another. (Hal-
leck's Treatise on International Law and Law of War, page 675).
EXECUTED CONTRACTS. (B)
Executed Contracts, - or those which are merely
suspended during hostilities. Theose contracts must have been
such before breaking out of war, otherwise it would be dependent
upon the sovereign power whether or no they survived. The most
existing,
interesting of this class are contracts of insurance, Abut by
the interference of war, one party is unable to fulfill his
11.
part. The doctrine is fully expressed in Summer vs. Hartford
Insurance Company (13 Wall. 158) The plaintiff was a resident
of Mi-ssissippi and the defendant a resident of Contiecticut*.
The plaintiff had insurance and the contract was that the amount
should be paid in sixty days and that any action against the
company must be brought inside of twelve months. Plaintiff
brings the action and then the war broke out and after the war
he continues. Defendants claim that he did not bring his action
in twelve months. The Court held- that there was a difference
from the statute in "twelve months from cause of action" and
"twelve months from loss." Here the plaintiff was prevented
from bringing his action in twelve months by the war; hence he
was relieved of this duty. The fact that he waited longer than
the number of days equal to twelve months is not material. The
twelve month limitation is unlike a statute and does not expand
enough to admit four years of war. That the war suspended the
contract until renewal of peace. And in Hamilton vs. The Mut-
ual Life Insurance Company of New York (9 Blatchford 234) where
one Goodman. had his life insured and had been paying the pre-
miums to the Company's agent in Alabama. The war broke out
and Goodman tried to pay premiums, but the Company had moved all
12.
of its agencies and he could not pay. After the war was over
he offered to pay the premiums in arrears, with interest, but
the defendants claimed that the contract was dissolved, there
being a term in the contract whicxsaid that any default in the
pay lent of premiums avoided the contract. The Court held:-
that the contract was merely suspended during the war; that
deceased (Goodman) had always been willing to pay premiums,
but there was no place to pay them, and the war having pre-
vented it, it was considered the same as a tender aZd refusal
to accept and therefore the exact day of payment was waived.
Held further:that the Insurance Company should accept the pre-
miums and pay the policy, or rather, pay the policy less the a-
mount of the unpaid premiums. Where the contract is such that
its continued existence does not depend on any further inter-
course between the parties, the effect is to suspend operations
and on return of peace the rights of the parties may be enfor-
ced. The Manhattan Insurance Company vs. Warwick (20 Grattan
(Va.) 614) is a similar case, except that the offer of payment
of premiums was made to agent in Richmond and was told that
the payments had to be made in New York. Held: The contract
was partly executory and partly executed. Entirely executory
on the part of the Insurance Company and partly executed and
13.
and partly not on part of Warwick. Judge Anderson here remarked
that he was under the impression that the principal that, "War
dissolves a contract" does not apply to a single instance of
a contract made and executed by one of the parties in whole or
in part before the war. And where the execution of the contract
on his part was completed before he was entitled to any perfor-
mance on the part of the other party had been partly performed)
or when the dissolution of the contract made before the war
would work a forfeiture, such an application of the rule would
be arbitrary, unreasonable and immoral. The parties entering
into the contract before the war did nothing criminal or unlaw-
ful, that they, or either of them should be laible to a punish-
ment of a forfeiture of their contract. This is not so when
the contract is made during the war. In that case it is crim-
inal and unlawful and therefore void. This seems to me the
proper distinction. The crime consists in exporting money or
property, or placing it in the power of the enemy, not in deliv-
ering to an alien enemy or his agent residing here under the
control of the government. If the debtor could have paid his
debt in any way during the war without danger of violating his
duty or the laws of the land, the interest on the debt does not
abate and he is still liable.
14.
The Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Company vs. Hen-
rietta Hilyard (37 N. J. L., 444) is also a case where it was
impossible to pay premiuns on account of war breaking out. The
Court held, not dissolved but merely suspended, and excused
for time being. (Bedle, J.) Whether a pre-existing contract
is dissolved or not, by the war, depends upon whether it is es-
sentially antagonistic to the laws governing a state of war.
If the contract is of a continuing nature, as in the case of
partnership, or of an executory character merely, and in the
performance of its features it would violate such laws, it would
be dissolved, but if not, and rights have become vested under
it, the contract will either be qualified or its performance
suspended, according to its nature, so as to strip it of its
objectionable features, and save such rights. The tendency of
adjudication is to preserve, and not to destroy contracts ex-
Isting before the war. (The policy was not forfeited by mere
non-payment of the premiums during the war.)
This kind of a contract is one for a life and not
for a year and the yearly payment is only part consideration.
(N. Y. Life Insurance Company vs. Strathem et al.,(93 U. S., 24)
See also Cohen vs. Mutual Life Isurance Co. (50 N. Y., 610.)
15.
UNEXECUTED AND CONTINUING CONTRACTS. (C)
Unexecuted and Continuing Contracts. or contracts
which are illegal and void by the operation of war. This is
the undisputed rule and I am unable to find authorities which
will give me light on a new theory. But the later tendencies
to promote commerce have weakened the heretofore unbreakable
rule and the nature and importance of the cohtract must rather
be the test. It is not the policy fop a civilized nation of
to-day to attach Iron-clad rules to their commercial prospects.
They al'st, indeed, be elastic to withstand the actions and re-
actions of a country at war, while the science of warfare has
heard the appeal of the commercial world and seeks to aid it by
an increase of privileges.
The doctrine was imported from the English by
Griswold vs. Waddington (15 Johns. (U. S.) 57),which is prob-
ably the foundation of the American rule. This was the case of
an American citizen who was a member of a firm in England and
also here in the United States. He never had any management of
the European firm, but rather cont.oolled the American firm.
The plaintiff sold goods during the War of 1812 to the English
firm and this action was to obtain a remission of certain for-
feitures and penalties incurred by the transmission of goods
16.
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to England andcioffer in evidence a statement by the defendant
that the certain partnership existed. The Court held that
the plaintif:sere not mislead by this statement as they knew
nothing of it when sale took placei that where two colintries
are at war, all communications and transactions between their
citizens are unlawful. The object of a partnership is to advance
and promote the objects of the concern. The war makes all the
citizens enemies with each other. If business were allowed the
very object of war would be defeated. The communication be-
tween these partners would be unlawful. Goods which are shipped
during hostilities are liable to seizure and condemnation. No
debts contracted in the partnership name can be recovered in
courts of either nation, nor can debts due the firm be recovered.
If the partnership were not dissolved, then each is liable, but
the opinion is that the war suspended the partnershiip rel at ons
between the partners, and that without doubt ipso facto dissol-
ved the firm. Each partner may dissolve the firm at any time,
but during the war notice cannot be given. When the law dissol-
ves the firm, public notice is unnecessary and the people are
obliged to know it. Therefore defendant is not liable, having
acted in good faith and if such partnership expire by their
own limitation during the war, public notice is not required.
17.
In Matthews vs. McStea (91 U. S. 7) defendant
claimed dissolution by war before the acceptance of certain
notes. Justice Strong held: that all the intercourse between
the two powers at war was unlawf'l and also between their sub-
jects. Each is an enemy of the other and it dissolves commer-
cial partnerships existing between subjects or citizens of the
two contending parties prior to the war. Civil war acts the
same as foreign war. However, trading with the enemy may be
allowed. It is the right of Congress, and the authority of
the President or Commander-in-chief of the land and naval forces
of the United States, in special cases to give licences to cer-
tain parties for the purpose of carrying on commercial trans-
actions even in time of war. But in a civil war, more than in
a foreign war, it is important that unequivocal notice should
be given of the illegality of traffic or commercial intercourse,
for In civil war only the government can know where the insur-
rection has assumed the characteristics of war. See also U. S.
vs. Lane (8 Wall. 195) and McKee vs. U. S. (8 Wall. 166)
A licence if given to a citizen is proper, but if
given to a neutral, it would be abuse of power and the goods
would be subject to capture and to condemnation in the prize
courts of the other belligerent and if issued to the subject
18.
of that belligerently the enemy, would also be liable to con-
fiscation as being a breach of their intelligence. (Note, 3
Wheaton, 207.)
In Bank of New Orleans (Resp.) vs. Edward Matthews
(42 N. Y. 12) which was an action on a promisory note made by
the firm, one member of which lived in Massachusetts and the
other in Confederate territory. The plaintiff endorsed the
note in May, 1862, but previously there had been a notice of
dissolution of the fiim published in New Orleans Picayune.
New Orleans was under Rebel forces until after the endorsement
of the note and then proclamation restored the commercial inter-
course with New Orleans. The point discussed was dissolution
of the firm by war. Peckham, J. held:- The general rule is
that war dissolves the partnership and converts every hostile
citizen into a public enemy. Therefore a citizen of New York,
a former member of the firm is not liable upon a note indorsed
in firm name after the cormencement of the war. In an action
on a note thus given, the fact that power of attorney had been
given to agent of the firm does not estop partner from alleging
a residence in New York in the absence of proof that the party
discounting the note had seen the power of attorney or believed
he lived in New Orleans. (Parsons on Partnership, page 29)
As to alieh enemies, partnership is impossible and if there be
a partnership with an alien friend and war breaks out, the war
entirely suspends the partnership. From the language sometimes
used, one would terminate and annul the partnership altogether,
and in many cases it might have this effect. But when the terms
and business and state of affairs of the partnership were such
that an entire suspension of all rights and intercourse during
the partnership would still leave the partnership in a condition
to go on as before when the war ended, we should say that the
partnership revived at peace, and did not need to be created
anew.
No alien enemy can bing an action in any court of
a hostile country and this rule has been applied to a citizen
then resident in a foreign country, and 6n the ground that if
he prevailed, and funds in satsifaction were remitted to a for-
eign country, it would strengthen the enemy. The reason is
that the existence of hostility between the two countries ren-
ders illegal all commercial intercourse between t;eir citizens.
This disability attaches to alien ca-rying on trade in enemies
countries, although he resides there, also as consul of a neu-
trel country. His individual chai-acter for purpose of trade
is not merged into his national character. In Willison vs.
20.
Patterson (7 Taunton 439) defendants gave notes to plaintiff
and they were accepted during war between England and France.
Defendants were residents of England and plaintiffs of France,
but were English citizens. The bills were drawn in France and
accepted by the defendants in England. The war was over before
the action began. Held:- this was trading between enemies and
the plaintiff could not recover. No c6ntract with al alien
enemy in time of war can be enforced in a Court of British
Judicature, although plaintiff does not sue until the return of
peace.
Scholefield vs. Eichellneger (7 Peters 568) was
an action for balance due on accont. Defendant claimed that
contract was mlade dpring war and was void. Plaintiff claims
that contract did not take effect until shipping of goods after
the war, and that it was valid. However, the Court held that
as the other partner had died during the war, and so the part-
nership was ended, and the contract was not extended beyond his
death. See also Woods vs. Wilder (43 N. Y. 164)
Effect on Interest and the Statute of Limitations (D)
The general rule as to interest on debts is that
as all business and transactions being forbidden between the
21.
partaes, the debtor was unable to pay if he wished to, without
violation of the positive laws of the country and nation. There-
fore, he shall not be liable to payment of interest, because
where a person is prevented from paying the principal during
war, he certainly would not be compelled to pay interest. See
Hoare vs. Allen(20 Dallas 102). However, the rule is changed
so that contracts which may be paid ducing the war without
breach of duty to the state and the debtors do not pay them,
then the interest runs.
The statute of limitations is also suspended dur-
ing the time of war by reason of the inability to enforce a claim.
In Lemres vs. Hartford Insurance Company (13 Wall. 158) it was
held that the disability to sue imposed by war relieved the par-
ty from the consequences of failing to bring suit within the
specified time in the policy. It would also seem that the same
principal applied to relieve party from non-payment of premiums
by the day on which they are due. And in Brown vs. Hiatt (1 Dil-
lon 372) it was held that the statute of limitations was sus-
pended during the time of the Civil War and even though the
statute began to run before the war, that time of war must be
taken out.
22.
TREATIES (E)
The question as to treaties has never been prac-
tically settled. It is generally believed, though, that they
are merely suspended during war. In the St. Lawrence difficulty,
Great Britain claimed that the war ended the treaty, while the
United States claimed that it was merely suspended. There are
treaties which are made in contemplation of war and as to these,
the rule is that they are neither avoided hor suspended, but
have full force and effect all of the time.
IV.
CONCLUSION.
By this time we have covered much of the ground
over which the wars and our late Civil War extended their power
over contracts. We have found that the object of war is to
subject one country to the will of another by public force. To
make all the citizens of one state enemies of the citizens of
the other is the necessary result of war between their govern-
ments. From the primitive idea of total destruction, our
23.
superior learning and pride have given us an idea of preser-
vation. That public policy is our standard of reckoning is
abundantly proved by the manner in which it is interwoven into
all the public acts of to-day. The strict neutrality preserved
by the United States in all matters concerning other nations
has grown up from our great ideas of public policy, the protec-
torate of our Congress.
The effect of our war appears to be to place the
citizens and belligerents in a state of non-intercourse; to ren-
der them the legal, not fighting, enemies of each other; to
uuspend all intercourse between citizens and belligerents; part-
nerships are dissolved; it renders all trade between belligerents
illegal and suspends treaties except those which only arise in
contemplation of war. But again our modern ideas have become
expanded and it is now that the remedies are suspended rather
than the rights. We may even continue the trade and intercourse
with belligerents by obtaining a licence. These are the fruits
of relaxation and al common in time of war in the United States.
The distinction between contracts which are executed and those
unexecuted is evened down by the esttence of certain contracts
which are inconsistent with suspension andtlicenced contracts.which
The line is becoming a fine one and the doctrine of preserva-
tion and the needs of our merchants weigh heavily on the here-
tofore solnd law of nations.
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